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Nobody Was Actually Buying Tulips: The Eternal Psychology of Speculative Fever

The Past Market
Nobody Was Actually Buying Tulips: The Eternal Psychology of Speculative Fever

Photo by Photo by Dmitrii E. on Unsplash on Unsplash

Here's a fact that should make every crypto investor deeply uncomfortable: the Dutch merchants who lost their shirts on tulip bulbs in 1637 were not idiots. They were, by the standards of their era, sophisticated financial operators. They had contracts, they had markets, they had price discovery mechanisms. They also had the exact same brain you're using right now to evaluate whether whatever asset is trending this week is "different."

It wasn't different then. It isn't different now.

The tulip mania is probably the most misunderstood financial event in popular history, which is saying something given the competition. Most people picture seventeenth-century Dutch merchants literally fighting over flowers, paying the equivalent of a house for a single bulb because they'd lost their minds. That's not quite what happened — and the corrected version is actually more alarming for what it tells us about modern markets.

What Was Actually Being Traded

By the peak of the tulip craze, most participants weren't exchanging physical bulbs at all. They were trading futures contracts — promises to deliver specific bulb varieties at specific prices on specific future dates. Sound familiar? The underlying asset was almost beside the point. What people were really buying and selling was the expectation of future price increases.

This is the part that maps directly onto every speculative episode since. Bitcoin at $60,000 in late 2021 wasn't primarily being purchased by people who wanted to use it as a currency. It was being purchased by people who expected someone else to pay $80,000 for it later. GameStop shares in January 2021 weren't flying because investors suddenly believed in the company's retail video game business model. They were flying because enough people believed enough other people would buy in, and the momentum itself became the product.

In Haarlem in 1636, a single Semper Augustus bulb contract changed hands at prices equivalent to roughly ten years of a skilled craftsman's wages. Nobody involved in that transaction was thinking about gardening.

The Three Phases That Never Change

Economist Hyman Minsky mapped out the lifecycle of financial manias in the twentieth century, but he was essentially just describing a pattern that's been repeating since antiquity. You can see the same three-beat structure in the South Sea Bubble of 1720, the railroad speculation of the 1840s, the dot-com boom of the late nineties, and the NFT frenzy of 2021.

Phase one is the displacement — some genuinely new thing arrives that does represent real value. Tulips were legitimately exotic, status-conferring luxury goods in seventeenth-century Europe. The internet genuinely did change commerce. Blockchain technology does have real applications. The early movers who identify real value in a new asset class aren't wrong. They're just not the ones who end up holding the bag.

Phase two is the credit expansion. This is where it gets dangerous, and it's where the historical record is most instructive. Dutch tulip traders developed a system of buying on margin — putting down a fraction of the contract value and borrowing the rest, betting on price appreciation to cover the difference. The Mississippi Company bubble of 1720 was explicitly fueled by the French government printing money to buy shares. The 2021 meme stock frenzy ran partly on Robinhood's commission-free margin trading. Cheap credit and a hot asset class are, historically speaking, a reliable disaster combination.

Phase three is the moment someone tries to cash out. In February 1637, buyers simply stopped showing up to a routine bulb auction in Haarlem. No dramatic crash, no single precipitating event — just an absence. Prices fell 99% within weeks. The people holding contracts had no recourse because the Dutch courts, sensibly if unhelpfully, ruled that tulip futures were essentially gambling debts and therefore unenforceable.

The 2022 crypto collapse followed the same rhythm. Luna/UST didn't fail because of some exotic technical flaw. It failed because confidence evaporated, and confidence was the only thing that had ever been holding it up.

Why Smart People Keep Doing This

Here's the uncomfortable part. The historical record doesn't show manias being driven by the naive and the foolish. Isaac Newton lost the equivalent of several million modern dollars in the South Sea Bubble. He reportedly said afterward that he could calculate the motions of heavenly bodies but not the madness of people. Smart people get caught in these traps because they're smart enough to construct convincing narratives for why the current situation is different.

The seventeenth-century Dutch merchants weren't wrong that tulips were valuable luxury goods in a wealthy, trade-connected society. The dot-com investors weren't wrong that the internet would transform commerce. The early Bitcoin adopters weren't wrong that decentralized digital currency had interesting properties. The error isn't in identifying something real — it's in the social contagion that takes a real insight and inflates it into a price that only makes sense if appreciation continues forever.

Psychologists call this herding behavior. Historians call it a mania. Traders call it a bull market, right up until the moment they don't.

What Five Thousand Years of Data Actually Suggests

If you read enough financial history — and we'd argue that reading financial history is a more useful activity than reading most market analysis — a few patterns emerge with uncomfortable consistency.

First, the mania always feels rational from the inside. The participants aren't experiencing themselves as irrational actors. They have models, they have data, they have reasons. The reasons are just downstream of a conclusion they've already emotionally committed to.

Second, the exit is always narrower than the entrance. This was true of tulip contracts in 1637, true of overbuilt railroad stocks in the 1840s, true of mortgage-backed securities in 2008. The number of people who want to sell at the top always exceeds the number of people willing to buy.

Third, and most relevant to whatever is currently trending on financial social media: the asset that everyone is certain is "different this time" is never actually different in the ways that matter. It may be different in a hundred interesting technical or cultural ways. The human psychology surrounding it is not.

The tulip wasn't the point in 1637. The expectation was the point. Four hundred years later, we're still buying the expectation and calling it the asset. The past market is open for business, and it's been running the same inventory for a very long time.


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